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CAUSATION, STATISTICS, AND THE LAW 
Richard Scheines* 
INTRODUCTION 
More and more, judges and juries are being asked to handle 
torts and other cases in which establishing liability involves 
understanding large bodies of complex scientific evidence. When 
establishing causation is involved, the evidence can be diverse, can 
involve complicated statistical models, and can seem impenetrable 
to non-experts. Since the decision in Daubert v. Merril Dow 
Pharms., Inc.1 in 1993, judges cannot simply admit expert 
testimony and other technical evidence and let jurors decide the 
verdict. Judges now must rule on which experts are admissible and 
which are inadmissible, and they must base their ruling at least 
partly on the status of the scientific evidence about which the 
expert will testify.2 This article is intended to provide judges with 
an accessible methodological overview of causal science. 
Part I of this article will explain the nature of causal claims in 
the realm of judicial evidence. Part II will address why these claims 
are difficult to prove scientifically and identify the different kinds 
of evidence typically used to prove causal claims. Part III will 
explain how the discipline of statistics fits into the science of 
establishing causal claims. Finally, part IV will summarize the 
necessary steps to take when evaluating a causation argument. As 
                                                           
 * Dr. Scheines is a Professor (and Head) of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon 
University, with courtesy appointments in the Department of Machine Learning 
and the Human-Computer Interaction Institute. 
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
2 Id. at 592–93. 
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these statistical arguments can seem quite complicated, the article 
will focus particularly on making them simple and intelligible.3  In 
order to make matters concrete, two examples will be used: 1) a 
hypothetical toxic tort involving liver cancer and QualChem 43;4 
and 2) another hypothetical involving exposure to lead and tested 
IQ in children. 
I. THE NATURE OF CAUSAL CLAIMS 
Two questions were posed within the hypothetical examples as 
a means of illustrating the various points of this article: 1) Was 
John Smith’s liver cancer caused by his exposure to QualChem 43 
and 2) Was the lower than average level of tested IQ scores among 
economically disadvantaged Boston area elementary school children 
a result of their exposure to lead from old paint and pipes. 
First, we must distinguish between individual and general 
causal claims.5  An individual claim involves a particular person or 
event and asserts that it was caused by another particular event or 
condition, e.g., John Smith’s liver cancer was caused by his 
exposure to QualChem 43 in the water he drank. A general causal 
claim refers to a population of individuals, and concerns the 
probability or average severity of a property (e.g., a disease) in that 
population.6  For example, in the lead and IQ claim, the population 
is economically disadvantaged Boston area elementary school 
children, the property is tested IQ, and the claim is that the average 
                                                           
3 The perspective I offer here is developed much more fully in an interactive 
textbook called Empirical Research Methods with Regression, by Steve Klepper 
and Richard Scheines, available online at http://www.cmu.edu/oli/, Empirical 
Research Methods, Open Learning Initiative, http://www.cmu.edu/oli/courses/ 
enter_erm.html. 
4 See “Toxic Tort Hypothetical,” attached at the end of this article. 
5 See COMM. ON EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE 
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS 7-1 
(Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow, eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY]; PETER SPIRTES ET AL., CAUSATION, PREDICTION, 
AND SEARCH (2d ed. 2000). 
6 PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 5. 
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level of the property is different than it would have been had the 
population not been exposed to lead. The general claim does not 
entail that every child in the population who was exposed to lead 
lost IQ points, nor does it claim that every child with a lower than 
average tested IQ was so because of exposure to lead. It is a claim 
about the average IQ in the population, and how that might have 
differed if the children had not been exposed to lead from old paint 
and old pipes. 
In both cases the essential claim is counterfactual: the effect 
would have been different if the cause had been different.7  For 
John Smith, the claim is: had John Smith not been exposed to 
QualChem 43, he would not have gotten liver cancer. For lead and 
IQ, the claim is: had the population of Boston children not been 
exposed to lead from old paint and pipes, their average IQ would 
have been higher. 
In both cases the counterfactual supposition is a bit vague. 
How are we to imagine John Smith’s life without QualChem 43?  
Do we imagine he avoided exposure to QualChem 43 by having 
lived in a different location? By having been wealthy and only 
consuming bottled water? How are we to imagine the Boston 
children’s life without lead? Are they allowed to relocate to 
Phoenix, Arizona, where much of the infrastructure is so new that 
lead doesn’t occur in paint and pipes? No. What we mean to 
suppose, in both cases, is that everything was as close to the way 
it actually happened as possible, except for removing the “cause.”  
For John Smith we imagine that he lived exactly the same life, but 
that his drinking water contained no QualChem 43. For the Boston 
children, we imagine that they lived exactly the same life, that their 
paint was identical in appearance but contained no lead, and that 
their pipes contained no lead but were otherwise indistinguishable.8  
                                                           
7 For more information about a counterfactual, and how it relates to 
causation, see generally CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS (John D. Collins, 
Ned Hall & L. A. Paul, eds., 2004). 
8 In these cases it is reasonably straightforward to imagine the counterfactual 
world that grounds the causal claim, whereas in others it’s not.  For example, 
suppose we claim that Jane Doe was the victim of sex discrimination. Had she 
been male, she would have received a higher salary. Imagining a world in which 
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We do not imagine John Smith as wealthy enough to purchase 
bottled water because had John Smith been affluent, he may have 
avoided liver cancer due to better access to health care, a more 
nutritious diet, and the other positive health benefits associated 
with higher socio-economic status. We need to imagine a 
circumstance in which the only difference between the actual world 
and the hypothetical world is the presence or absence of the 
purported “cause.” 
This counterfactual perspective, made famous by Donald 
Rubin (1974),9 makes it clear why causal claims are so hard to 
establish scientifically. We cannot go back in time and watch John 
Smith re-live his life without QualChem 43, nor can we go back in 
time and remove lead from the environment of the Boston children 
and then re-test their IQs. Our only realistic option is to find a 
feasible real-world surrogate for the inaccessible counterfactual 
world. 
In the individual case, such as that of John Smith, this strategy 
is practically hopeless. We cannot seriously hope to find another 
individual sufficiently close in makeup and circumstance to John 
Smith, save being exposed to QualChem 43. Even if Smith was 
born with an identical twin who was not exposed to QualChem 43, 
the circumstances of the twin’s life are almost certainly different 
from John Smith’s living conditions to the extent that a comparison 
would be practically meaningless. Even worse, if exposure to a 
chemical does not determine a disease, but only changes one’s 
chances of getting it, then comparing a single alternative is not 
much help. 
The situation for general causal claims is better but nonetheless 
challenging. Consider the following figure. 
                                                           
everything was the same as the actual world, except for Jane Doe’s sex, is not at 
all straightforward. See David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. OF PHIL. 556, 557–58 
(1973). 
9 Donald Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized 
and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. OF EDUC. PSYCH. 632, 688–701 (1974). 
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Figure 1: Counterfactual vs. Actual Populations 
 
Suppose that the box in the upper left of Figure 1 (Actual 
Population 1) represents the actual population of Boston school 
children we are considering. The box below it (Counterfactual 
Population 1) represents a counterfactual world we cannot access: 
a world involving the same children living the same life, save that 
we have gone back in time and intervened to remove the lead from 
the paint and the pipes but otherwise left things alone. The box in 
the upper right (Actual Population 2) represents what we can 
obtainanother group of actual children that are not exposed to 
lead. For example, we might consider children from Phoenix, 
Arizona that are otherwise as similar as possible to the Boston 
children in our original population. The problem, of course, is that 
such a group will inevitably differ in lots of ways, many of which 
might well be relevant to their tested IQ. 
Counterfactual 
Population 1: 
Changed to eliminate lead  
 
Average(IQ) = ?? 
Actual Population 1: 
 
Average(IQ) = X 
Causation 
 
Actual Population 2: 
No lead exposure 
observed 
 
Average(IQ) = ?? 
SCHEINES FINAL WITH TOXIC TORT HYPOTHETICAL ATTACHED 5.DOC 1/17/08 2:11 PM 
140 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
II. THE KINDS OF EVIDENCE FOR CAUSAL CLAIMS 
There are three kinds of evidence typically used in scientifically 
establishing general level causal claims: clinical trials, observational 
studies, and biological/toxicological studies.10 
A. Clinical Trials 
Sir Ronald Fisher, the brilliant and prolific British statistician, 
provided in the 1930s what is still the gold standard today for 
causal inference: the randomized trial (“RT”).11 In its simplest 
form, an RT randomly splits a population into two subgroups, 
thus creating two “versions” of the same population,12 and then 
exposes one sub-population to the cause (the “treated” group) and 
does not expose one to the cause (the “control” group). The 
frequency of the effect in the two groups provides evidence of the 
probability of the effect in the two populations we seek: one in 
which the cause is present, and an identical copy in which the 
cause is not present. Subtleties abound, but the basic strategy is 
sound and taught in every introductory research methods course. 
The problem, of course, is that performing an RT is either 
ethically or practically impossible in a number of situations. We 
simply cannot intentionally expose half a population of children to 
lead or QualChem 43. There are essentially two recourses to an 
RT: 1) we can conduct an observational study and statistically 
adjust for naturally occurring differences in two populations, or 2) 
                                                           
10 For a much more detailed discussion, see PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, 
supra note 5 at 117–38; CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SVCS, 2004 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT—THE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING (2004); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000). 
11 RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 
(4th ed., Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd 1932) (1925). 
12 They are not literally the same, of course. Because they were formed by 
randomly assigning individuals to one subgroup or the other, we can expect 
both groups to share the same statistically measurable qualities (e.g., same 
percentage of smokers and non-smokers, same percentage of lower, middle, and 
upper class people, etc.). Thus, when viewed as whole groups, they are 
statistically identical. 
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we can perform very small versions of RTs on animals we deem 
appropriate for testing despite the inflicted harm, e.g., rodents. 
B. Observational Studies 
Observational studies involve human populations in which we 
do not control exposure to a cause.13 Thus, we are typically 
comparing an actual subpopulation whose members were exposed 
to a cause and another subpopulation whose members were not 
exposed, e.g., Actual Population 1 as compared to Actual 
Population 2 in Figure 1. For example, in examining whether 
poverty causes crime, sociologists might collect data on a 
subpopulation of people below the poverty line and compare them 
to a subpopulation of people above the poverty line. The study is 
“observational” if the sociologist does not intervene to affect 
whether any of the subjects were above or below poverty. 
In some cases, the “cause” is not a simple on-off event like 
“below the poverty line” versus “above the poverty line,” but 
rather, the cause is a factor that can take on values across a large 
range, e.g., yearly income in dollars. For example, another 
sociologist might sample a population and measure each 
individual’s level of income according to dollars earned per year and 
their criminal activity according to the number of days spent in jail. 
An observational study that involves health or disease is called 
an “epidemiological study.”14 A classic example is a “cohort” study 
in which groups which vary by exposure are tracked over time and 
compared as to some health outcome like cancer. For example, 
Takeshi Hirayama (1984)15 tracked lung cancer mortality for over 
16 years in over 90,000 non-smoking wives in Japan, some of 
                                                           
13 PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 2 (2d ed. 2002). 
14 KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998). 
15 Takeshi Hirayama, Cancer Mortality in Nonsmoking Women With 
Smoking Husbands Based on a Large-Scale Sohort Study in Japan, 13 
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 680, 680–90 (1984). 
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whom were married to non-smokers, some to moderate smokers, 
some to heavy smokers. 
Another type of epidemiological study is a “case-control” 
study: instead of comparing the frequency of an effect in two 
subpopulations that vary as to the cause, epidemiologists compare 
the level of exposure to the cause in two subpopulations that differ 
on the effect. For example, in the toxic tort hypothetical involving 
QualChem 43, epidemiologists employed by the Mississippi 
Department of Public Health compared the rate of exposure to 
QualChem 43 between a group of liver cancer patients and a group 
of similar patients without liver cancer. 
The essential methodological issue in observational studies is 
that populations that vary in level of exposure to the cause might 
vary in other ways that are relevant to the effect. This is generally 
called the problem of “confounding” and how scientists address 
this problem will be discussed later in the section on statistics. 
C. Biological/Toxicological Studies 
In many cases, animals like rats, mice, rabbits, or chimps seem 
to have physiological pathways or components sufficiently similar 
to our own that we believe we can extrapolate from what happens 
in experiments with animals to what would happen in similar 
experiments with humans. Biologists frequently perform controlled 
experiments on rodents to garner evidence for whether some 
chemical causes cancer. They expose some rodents to a “control” 
and others that are genetically identical and raised in the same 
environment to the chemical of interest, and then biologists 
compare the frequency of cancerous tumors. For example, in the 
hypothetical toxic tort involving QualChem 43, rats were used in a 
study to examine the toxicology of QualChem 43 with respect to 
liver cancer. 
The degree to which such studies are relevant to the causal 
claim in humans depends upon 1) whether the physiological 
mechanism by which the chemical produces the disease in the 
experimental animals is similar to the mechanism that would 
produce the disease in humans, and 2) whether we can translate 
animal doses to human doses in terms of equivalent toxicity. For 
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example, in the toxicological study on rats in the toxic tort 
hypothetical, “researchers believe that both liver and kidney cancer 
are initiated by perturbations in cell differentiation,” and therefore 
they believe that the mechanisms are similar enough in humans to 
make the animal results relevant. In terms of the dosage, the 
researchers responsible for the study believe that they can roughly 
translate the dosage given to each group of rats into human units, 
and in this case, the number of lifetime equivalent doses to which 
John Smith was exposed. Thus the first group of rats was exposed 
to the equivalent of twice the dose of QualChem 43 that John 
Smith received in his lifetime. 
III. STATISTICS AND CAUSATION 
Studies reported in peer reviewed scientific journals can seem 
filled with statistical tables and jargon. This section will identify 
what is essential about what the statistics indicate while also 
explaining what is not essential and why. 
The scientific case for causation is usually made in two stages. 
First, we make the prima facie case that there is a statistical 
association between the purported cause and the effect. As several 
different causal arrangements can produce statistical association, 
however, association by itself does not prove causation. In the 
second stage of making a scientific case for causation, we attempt 
to eliminate all other possible explanations of this association. In 
both stages, statistical methods are involved. 
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A. Making a Prima Facie Case for Causation: Establishing an 
Association 
 
Actual Population  1: 
 
Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause)  
Counterfactual Population  1: 
 
 
Prob(Effect | Cause removed ) 
Causal  
Association  
Actual Population  2: 
 
Prob(Effect | Not Exposed to Cause)  
 
Observed Association  
 
 
Figure 2: Causation vs. Association16 
Consider Figure 2, which is a slightly revised version of Figure 
1. To establish causation, we need to show that the effect is more 
probable among those exposed to the cause than it would have been 
among the same group, had they not been exposed to the cause. In 
Figure 2, this translates into comparing the two columns in Table 1: 
 
Actual Population 1 Counterfactual Population 1 
Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause) Prob(Effect | Cause removed) 
Table 1: Causal Association 
The difference in these probabilities is the causal effect, and it is 
the Holy Grail of Causal Science.17 There are two major scientific 
challenges to getting there: 
                                                           
16 The expression Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause) denotes the probability 
of the effect among those Exposed to the Cause. It also might be referred to as 
the conditional probability of the Effect, given Exposure to the Cause. In the 
Counterfactual Population 1, the notation Prob(Effect | Cause removed) shows 
“removed” in italics to emphasize that we are intervening to remove the cause. 
17 SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 5; Rubin, supra note 9, at 688–701. 
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1. Counterfactual populations are unobservable: because 
we cannot go back in time and remove the cause from the 
actual exposed population, we are forced to compare two 
distinct actual populations. 
2. Probabilities are unobservable: we can only study a 
finite sample of individuals and then make a statistical 
inference about the probabilities from the observed 
frequencies in the sample. 
Let us focus first on the second problem, in which the use of 
statistics is, if not simple, fairly straightforward. If we can do a 
randomized trial, then we can compare two groups that we expect 
to be identical, and thus overcome the first obstacle. That is, in an 
RT we assume the difference in Table 2 will correspond to the 
difference in Table 1. 
 
 
Actual Population 1 Actual Population 2 
Prob(Effect | Assigned to: 
Exposed to the Cause) 
 Prob(Effect | Assigned to: 
Not Exposed to the Cause) 
Table 2: Association in a Randomized Trial 
Although the challenge of unobservable probabilities must still 
be overcome in a RT, the discipline of statistics provides us with a 
rigorous theory of how to do so.  For example, consider a fictitious 
(and unethical) study involving QualChem 43 and liver cancer 
involving a sample of 100 people, half of whom were chosen at 
random and intentionally exposed to Qualchem 43 and the other 
half intentionally not exposed. In this example, and several that 
follow, the true causal process was simulated on a computer, and 
samples were pseudo-randomly drawn from the population that 
the computer model defined. Thus, in each case, when reference is 
made to the “true” model, such reference is to the computer 
simulation rather than the real world. 
Figure 3 shows hypothetical frequencies of liver cancer 20 
years later in both the exposed and unexposed groups. The left side 
of the figure shows a bar chart for the group exposed to QualChem 
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43, about 20% of whom contracted liver cancer, and the right side 
shows a bar chart for the unexposed group, about 3% of whom 
developed liver cancer. The difference in the charts reflects the 
statistical association between liver cancer and QualChem 43, and 
the association appears to be substantial. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: QualChem 43 Trial 
Calling the “difference” in the charts an “association” is a little 
vague without defining what constitutes an association. To discuss 
the notion of association scientifically, we must have a clear and 
precise measure of association.  We can then estimate the 
association from data and assess the range of our uncertainty 
around this estimate. The following section presents three 
measures of association that are commonly employed: Relative 
Risk, Odds Ratio, and Correlation. 
1. Relative Risk 
The most common measure of association in disease and 
exposure studies is called the relative risk, or RR. The relative risk 
is defined as: 
 
exposednot #disease with exposednot #
exposed#disease with exposed#
)unexposed(
)exposed(
==
incidence
incidence
RR  
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In Figure 3, the relative risk for liver cancer of QualChem 43 is 
.202 / .032 = 6.31. A relative risk of 1.0 reflects that the frequency 
of disease among the exposed is the same as among the unexposed, 
thereby indicating that there is zero association. A relative risk of 
10 means that the rate of disease among the exposed is ten times as 
high as among the unexposed. 
A high relative risk does not imply a high absolute risk in the 
population. If, for example, one in a million unexposed individuals 
gets the disease but 10 in a million exposed individuals get the 
disease, then the relative risk is 10, even though the chances of 
getting the disease among those exposed is still only 1 in 100,000. 
Another measure of association that is commonly used in case-
control studies like the one described in the toxic tort hypothetical 
discussed later is the odds ratio, or OR: 
 
exposednot &diseasewithout # exposednot &diseasewith #
exposed&disease without #exposed&diseasewith #
=OR  
 
No matter which measure of association one uses, however, the 
key statistical question is whether from the observed association 
we can infer that there is a real (population) association. 
2. Hypothesis Tests and P-values 
The most common statistical method with which to make this 
inference is called a hypothesis test, particularly the “null” 
hypothesis that the real association is zero and the observed 
association was due to random chance.18 The first example cited in 
nearly every textbook is a fair coin, which we can assume has a 
probability of landing heads of 50%. If we flip a new coin 1,000 
times and observe 590 heads and 410 tails, for example, we might 
question whether it was really fair. One way to answer this 
question is to compute how likely it is that in 1,000 trials we 
would see a deviation from 500-500 of 90 (or more) if the coin is 
really fair. If this is highly unlikely, then we reject the “null” 
                                                           
18 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH (2d ed. 2000). 
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hypothesis, and we conclude that the new coin is not fair. In 
making the prima facie case in causal science, the null hypothesis is 
that there is zero association between the cause and effect. Under 
this assumption, we compute the likelihood that the non-zero 
association we observed is purely due to random chance in the 
sample we drew. If it is highly unlikely to have observed an 
association of such magnitude, then we can conclude the 
association is indeed significant. 
For example, consider another fictitious study in which we 
examine whether QualChem 57, a chemical similar to QualChem 43, 
causes liver cancer. Suppose in this study, involving only 50 
subjects, we observe frequencies (Figure 4) that appear to indicate 
almost exactly the same level of association that was seen in Figure 
3 for QualChem 43. 
In Figure 4, the percentage of liver cancer is 19% among those 
intentionally exposed to QualChem 57 and nearly 4% among the 
group not exposed, thereby producing a Relative Risk of 4.8. On 
one hand, the study may show that QualChem 57 causes liver 
cancer, however, on the other hand, the chemical may have no 
effect if the observed association is due to random chance. For 
example, the probability that we would see an association as big as 
the one in Figure 4 from random chance, even if there was zero 
association in the population from which we sampled is 0.21. This 
number is called a p-value. The p-value tells us that if QualChem 
57 and liver cancer had no association in reality, but we 
nevertheless repeated the same experiment ad infinitum, then we 
would still expect to observe as large an association as the one in 
Figure 4 over 20% of the time. Since the observed association in 
Figure 4 could so easily be explained by random chance, it is said to 
be statistically insignificant. In the computer simulation for 
QualChem 57 and liver cancer, QualChem 57 had no effect on liver 
cancer, there was no association whatsoever in the underlying 
model (RR = 1.0), and the observed RR = 4.8 was entirely due to 
random sampling variation. 
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Figure 4: QualChem 57 Trial 
Associations reported in studies are not typically considered 
statistically significant unless the chances of seeing that large an 
association just from random chance are less than .05, or one in 
twenty. This is a completely arbitrary convention, and can be quite 
misleading when interpreted as a strict threshold, or decision rule. 
In Figure 3, for example, the association (RR= 6.31) in the sample 
has a p-value = .058 which would be considered statistically 
insignificant at a threshold of .05 even though the Relative Risk in 
the underlying model simulated in the computer was 4.4 
(probabilities equal to 22% for exposed and 5% for unexposed). 
3. Confidence Intervals 
Confidence intervals are closely related to p-values and serve as 
an attempt to capture the uncertainty in a parameter estimate that 
is due to random chance, or “sampling variability.”  For example, in 
a political poll that reports the percentage of people who approve 
of George Bush’s performance as President, the result might be 
described as “accurate to within plus or minus three percentage 
points.”19 Statistically speaking, this means if the survey was 
repeated numerous times, each with the same number of subjects, 
and each time we reported our findings as an interval that was 
within three percentage points of the percentage that we observed, 
                                                           
19 See, e.g., PollingReport.Com, President Bush: Job Ratings, http:// 
www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
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then 95% of the time our interval would contain the true 
percentage. The 95% is the “confidence level,” and again, using 
95% is a purely arbitrary convention. 
With a bigger sample, the 95% confidence interval gets 
narrower, and the results of the study become more precise. Many 
political polls, for example, sample the opinions of just over 1,000 
voters.20 With this sample size, a 95% confidence interval usually 
amounts to plus or minus three percentage points. If the pollsters 
interviewed 10,000 voters, then a 95% confidence interval would 
be approximately plus or minus 1 percentage point.21 
Adjusting the confidence level also changes the size of the 
interval. If the political pollsters took a sample of 1,000, but 
reported a 50% confidence interval instead of a 95% confidence 
interval, the results would be accurate within slightly more than 
one percentage point. 
In the case of establishing an association to make a prima facie 
case for causation, the parameter of interest is the size of the 
association in the population. In Figure 3, for example, the sample 
drawn from the population exhibits a relative risk of 6.31. Maybe 
the real RR (the RR in the population, which we cannot observe) is 
actually 6.29. Maybe the RR in the population is 1.0 (no 
association). The 95% confidence interval around our estimated 
RR=6.31 includes a RR of 1.0, and therefore, a population with no 
association is within our 95% confidence interval. A 90% interval 
would not include a RR of 1.0. Similarly, in the case-control study 
in the toxic tort hypothetical, Exhibit C shows 90% and 95% 
confidence intervals for the estimated odds-ratio of 3.2. As you can 
see, the 90% interval is nested within the 95%, and the 95% 
interval includes a RR of 1.0 while the 90% interval does not 
include the same RR. A 100% interval would have to include all 
possible levels of association. 
The relationship between p-values and confidence intervals is 
simple. Whatever the observed level of association A, if an X% 
                                                           
20 See, e.g., id. 
21 To see how the confidence level, confidence interval, and sample size 
interact, see the Sample Size Calculator at www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
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confidence interval around A meets exactly the number that 
corresponds to zero association, then the observed level of 
association A is significant at a p-value of X%. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Confidence level = p-value 
For example, in the case-control study in the toxic tort 
hypothetical, a 94% confidence interval would meet exactly zero, 
therefore the association is significant at a p-value of .06. 
4. Correlation 
These points apply equally well in cases in which we are 
examining a dose-response relationship between quantities that 
vary across a numerical range, such as exposure to lead and IQ. In 
that case, the measure of association typically used is the 
correlation coefficient. The p-value and confidence interval have the 
same logic for correlation as they do for relative risk, odds ratio, or 
any other statistical measure of association. For example, in a 
fictitious experiment (again, simulated in a computer) in which a 
sample of 160 children were exposed to a random amount of lead 
for the first seven years of life and then given an IQ test on their 
seventh birthday, we might observe the scatter-plot of dose-
response shown in Figure 6. The blue line represents the best-
fitting line (regression line) in which IQ is predicted from lead 
exposure. The correlation coefficient of -.211 is a measure of 
association in this type of sample. The p-value of .007 indicates 
that the probability of observing this large a negative correlation 
from just random chance is .007. Since .007 is very low, and well 
below .05 or the other common cutoff .01, the correlation would be 
considered significant. 
Zero                               A 
Association           (Observed Association) 
X% Confidence Interval 
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Figure 6: Lead and IQ Scatterplot 
In these three fictitious cases, we came close to making a prima 
facie case for the hypothesis that QualChem 43 causes liver cancer 
(p-value = .058, Figure 3), we failed to make a prima facie case for 
the hypothesis that QualChem 57 causes liver cancer (p-value = 
.21, Figure 4), and we easily made a prima facie case for the 
hypothesis that lead causes IQ deficits in 7 year olds (p-value = 
.007, Figure 6). 
To summarize, getting to the Holy Grail of Causal Science 
requires overcoming two obstacles: comparing the right actual 
populations and making statistical inferences. No matter which 
populations we compare, to make a prima facie case for causation 
requires the statistical inference that there is association between 
the putative cause and the effect. P-values and confidence intervals 
help us get over the “is there really an association” obstacle. 
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B. Challenges to the Prima Facie Case 
Supposing that we have passed the prima facie test for 
causation, what more remains in order to establish (and estimate 
the strength of) a causal relationship? In the case of a randomized 
trial, nothing. That is because a randomized trial overcomes the 
first obstacle to establishing causationcomparing the right 
populations. 
In an observational study, however, we cannot assume that a 
group that was exposed to the cause and another group that was 
not exposed are otherwise the same. For example, suppose we 
compare two groups in an observational study: one group that was 
exposed to QualChem 43 and one group that was unexposed to the 
chemical. Suppose the first group of 200 lived on the Blue River in 
Mississippi, where they were exposed to QualChem 43 from the 
release of the chemical into the Blue River near their houses. 
Suppose the second group of 200 lived on the Red River in Kansas. 
Suppose that the relative risk of liver cancer between the two 
groups was 2.3, which was significant at a p-value = .003 and thus 
passed the prima facie test with flying colors. Statistically, it is true 
to say that the chance of observing an RR of 2.3, if there is none in 
the population, is less than 3 in 1,000. Therefore, let us agree that 
there is an association between QualChem 43 exposure and liver 
cancer. 
Suppose, however, that the socioeconomic status (“SES”) of 
the Red River families was on average much higher than the Blue 
River families. As a result of their lower SES, the Blue River 
families are less able to afford to live away from industry and thus 
more prone to QualChem 43 exposure. Further, as a result of lower 
SES, Blue River families also tend to consume a more unhealthy 
diet and more alcohol, both of which cause liver cancer (Figure 7). 
The different average SES in the two groups is called a 
“confounder,” as it is an alternative, non-causal explanation of the 
association between QualChem 43 exposure and liver cancer. 
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Figure 7: Confounding 
The big problem is that the size of the observed association has 
no logical relation to whether it came from confounding or 
causation. 
For example, Figure 8 shows the results of a simulation in 
which QualChem 43 causes liver cancer, but the casual relationship 
between the chemical and cancer is weak (RR = 1.33). In the 
sample of 200 drawn, the observed RR = 1.29 (p-value = 0.11), is 
not significant at the usual level of .05 or even at the weaker 
significance level of .10. 
Low SES 
High Alcohol 
Consumption 
Liver Cancer 
Poor  
Diet  
 Exposure to 
QualChem 43 
Can’t Afford 
Housing far from 
Industry 
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Figure 8: Causation, RR= 1.29, p = .11 
Figure 9 shows the results of a simulation in which QualChem 
43 does NOT cause liver cancer, but is associated with the disease 
(RR=2.4) as a result of the confounder SES. In the random sample 
of 200 drawn in this simulation, the RR is 2.3 with a p-value well 
under .01results which would pass muster as statistically 
significant in any court of science or law. 
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Figure 9: Confounding, RR = 2.3, p < .01 
Unfortunately, we do not get to see the “correct graph” in the 
real world; only the observed RR or some other measure of 
association. From the above hypotheticals, it should be obvious 
that association doesn’t prove causation. If the association appears 
statistically real, that does not mean the association was produced 
by a causal relationship, but rather, only that it was not produced 
by random chance. 
It is tempting to think that the statistical level of 
certainty/uncertainty about an association should translate in some 
way to a level of certainty/uncertainty about whether there is a 
causal relationship. For example, if in study 1 the RR for chemical 
A is significant at a p-value of .04, and in study 2 the RR for 
chemical B is significant at a p-value of .00001, then it is tempting 
to think that the case for causation is correspondingly stronger for 
chemical B than it is for chemical A. However, confounding renders 
this belief inaccurate. 
If confounding is plausible, which is almost always the case in 
an observational study, then the level of statistical uncertainty about 
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the size of the association has almost nothing to do with the level of 
uncertainty about the size of the causal effect.22 The lack of a 
relationship between the statistical uncertainties of the association 
and the size of the causal effect cannot be emphasized strongly 
enough as it is easy to confuse statistical certainty about 
association (low p-values, tight confidence intervals) with scientific 
certainty about causation. 
As if the worry about confounding wasn’t enough of a 
challenge to the prima facie case for causation, there are other 
reasons why an observed association might be spurious, that is, 
explicable by some non-causal reason. In case control studies like 
the one described in the hypothetical toxic tort, for example, 
instead of comparing the frequency of the effect (e.g., liver cancer) 
among two groups that differ on the cause, epidemiologists 
compare the frequency of exposure to the cause among two groups 
that differ on the effect (e.g., a group of liver cancer patients versus 
a group of otherwise similar patients who do not have liver 
cancer).23 If the frequency of exposure is different, then an 
association exists between the cause and the effect. 
A common source of spurious association in case-control 
studies is “recall bias.”24  For example, consider Figure 10, which 
shows a causal structure in which actual exposure to QualChem 43 
has no effect on liver cancer, but in which recalled exposure and 
liver cancer will be associated. This is quite plausible, as liver 
cancer patients who are asked to recall whether they were exposed 
to QualChem 43 might be suspicious that some industrial chemical  
                                                           
22 See James M. Robins, Confidence Intervals for Causal Parameters, 7 
STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 773, 773–85 (1988); see also James M. Robins, 
Richard Scheines, Peter Spirtes, & Larry Wasserman, Uniform Consistency in 
Causal Inference, 90 BIOMETRIKA 491, 491–515 (2003). 
23 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
24 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
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emitted by some uncaring chemical company caused their cancer, 
while similar individuals who are otherwise healthy will have no 
extra motivation to recall being exposed. 
  
 
 
Figure 10: Recall Bias 
C. Overcoming Challenges to the Prima Facie Case 
1. Statistically Adjusting for Confounding 
If an epidemiologist were to compare the Red River group to 
the Blue River group, they would be well aware that these groups 
might differ in ways germane to the causal claim at issue. In 
particular, epidemiologists would almost certainly entertain the 
idea that the groups differed as to SES. As a result, they would 
undoubtedly employ the most common strategy in dealing with 
differences in two populations in an observational study: 
epidemiologists would measure SES and adjust for the difference 
statistically.25 They would compute the association between 
QualChem 43 and liver cancer that arises because of differences in 
SES, and then report only the residual association between 
QualChem 43 and liver cancer that could not be explained by SES.26 
The researchers would then test whether this adjusted association 
could be explained by random chance (natural sample variation).27 
For example, Figure 9 shows a study in which the RR for 
QualChem 43 and liver cancer is 2.3, which is a significant 
association (p-value < .01). If, however, we adjust the association 
                                                           
25 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
26 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
27 ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
Actual Exposure to 
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by controlling for SES, then the RR = 1.17 and is insignificant (p-
value = .83). Thus, in this case, QualChem 43 passed the prima 
facie test but did not withstand challenges to the test. 
When the measure of association used is correlation, then by far 
the most commonly used statistical technique for adjusting for 
confounders is multiple regression.28 Easy to interpret and use, 
multiple regression computes the correlation between a putative 
cause and effect adjusting for any number of “covariates” 
(measured confounders). 
When is the strategy of adjusting for confounders reliable for 
overcoming challenges to the prima facie test? First, it is only 
reliable if we have adjusted for all the differences in the two 
populations that are potential causes of the effect, i.e. if we have 
controlled for all the potential confounders. Just as our prima facie 
case for QualChem 43 in the Figure 9 study came undone when we 
adjusted for SES, another study that showed a significant 
association after adjusting for SES might come undone when we 
adjust not only for SES but also for age. Just as the p-value or 
confidence interval for an unadjusted association between a 
potential cause X and an effect Y tells us very little about the level 
of our uncertainty as to whether X is a true cause of Y, the p-value 
of an adjusted association tells us very little about the level of our 
uncertainty as to whether X is a true cause of Y. Adjusting for 
confounders is crucial, but unless we are confident we have 
measured and adjusted for all the confounders, we cannot quite yet 
reach for the Holy Grail of Causal Science. 
The second major scientific problem in adjusting for 
confounders is that they must be measured accurately. In many 
cases, what we can measure is a very noisy approximation of the 
real thing. For example, consider the case of lead and IQ. If we 
made a prima facie case that exposure to lead was negatively 
correlated with IQ, an immediate challenge to inferring causation is 
the spurious association that might arise from parental resources 
(Figure 11). Parents with higher levels of resources, financial and 
                                                           
28 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 179–200 (2d ed. 2000). 
. 
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otherwise, will avoid housing that might have lead contamination 
from paint or pipes (or they will have it repaired), and they will 
also typically provide more stimulation to their children, especially 
the type that will result in higher tested IQ, entry into a good 
school, good college, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Confounder of Lead and IQ: 
Parental Resources 
 
Thus any study on the causal connection between lead and IQ 
should report a correlation adjusted for the level of parental 
resources. How are we to measure the level of parental resources? 
Going into the home and extensively surveying and observing the 
parents would be ideal but also impractical. Sociologists are more 
likely to ask the mother how many years of education she has 
completed.29 The number of years of education the mother has 
completed is a good proxy of for parental resources, but an 
imperfect one. Unfortunately, statistically adjusting for an 
imperfect measure of a confounder is the same as partially omitting 
the confounder altogether. The more imperfect the measure, the 
more it is akin to omission. 
 
                                                           
29 See, e.g., J.L. Needleman, S. Geiger & R. Frank, Lead and IQ scores: a 
reanalysis, 227 SCIENCE 701, 701–04 (1985). 
?? 
Parental Resources 
Lead Exposure Tested IQ 
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Figure 12: Confounder Measured Poorly 
For example, consider a simulated example (Figure 12) in which 
lead exposure has no effect on tested IQ. Thus any observed 
correlation is spurious and due entirely to parental resources or to 
random variation in sampling. Further, consider a measure of 
imperfect parental resources (“PR Measure”): ½ of the variation in 
the measure is from variation in parental resources, but ½ is from 
unrelated noise. Table 3 shows, in a simulated sample (N=1,000), 
the correlation between lead and IQ, the correlation adjusted for 
parental resources, and the correlation adjusted for PR Measure. 
Table 3: Unadjusted and Adjusted Correlations 
Correlation Value p-value 
Unadjusted  (ρlead,IQ ) -0.159 <0.001** 
Adjusted for Parental Resources 
(ρlead,IQ.Parental_Resources) 
-0.052   0.125 
Adjusted for PR Measure (ρlead,IQ.PR_Measure ) -0.106   0.011** 
 
Although the unadjusted correlation is only -.159, it is highly 
significant statistically. When adjusted for the true confounder 
(parental resources), the correlation is insignifant (p-value = .125). 
Thus, the prima facie case passes but the case cannot withstand a 
standard challenge. If, instead of adjusting for parental resources, 
however, we used the imperfect PR measure, then the adjusted 
correlation appears significant at .011. Such a correlation is 
sufficient for any court of law or science, but because we have 
adjusted on an imperfect measure, we have produced a biased 
estimate of the adjusted association. 
Again, just as the p-value or confidence interval for an 
unadjusted association between a potential cause X and an effect Y 
Noise 
Parental Resources 
Lead Exposure Tested IQ 
PR Measure 
SCHEINES FINAL WITH TOXIC TORT HYPOTHETICAL ATTACHED 5.DOC 1/17/08 2:11 PM 
162 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
tells us very little about the level of our uncertainty as to whether 
X is a true cause of Y, the p-value of an adjusted association tells 
us very little about the level of our scientific uncertainty as to 
whether X is a true cause of Y, especially in cases in which the 
confounders are measured poorly. 
In cases in which most of the observed association is due to 
confounding, for example, it doesn’t take much measurement error 
to produce a spurious adjusted association. In the case of lead and 
its effect on IQ, for example, we would expect most of the 
observed negative correlation between lead exposure and IQ to arise 
not from the effect of lead upon IQ, but from the confounder SES. 
To tease out the smaller effect of lead after adjusting for the 
substantial effect of SES, we must measure SES accurately and 
precisely. 
Adjusting for confounders is crucial, but we must adjust for all 
the confounders, and measure them well. 
2. Other Strategies 
It deserves mentioning that a variety of other techniques exist 
for overcoming challenges to the prima facie case, none of which 
will be described in any detail here. For example, economists, and 
increasingly epidemiologists, use instrumental variable estimators 
to overcome the possible bias from confounders.30 The advantage 
of instrumental variable estimators is that they do not require 
enumerating, measuring, and adjusting for all possible confounders. 
They do, however, require a strong assumption concerning how the 
instrumental variable relates to the possible confounders. 
Instrumental variables are by no means a panacea. 
In many cases temporal information and background or 
theoretical knowledge can serve to eliminate alternative 
explanations of the observed association. For example, in a 2004 
study of terrorist attacks and their effect on Israeli psychology, 
                                                           
30 See Sander Greenland, An Introduction to Instrumental Variables for 
Epidemiologists, 29(4) INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 722, 722–29 (2000). 
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Guy Stecklov and Joshua R. Goldstein31 make a prima facie case 
by showing that there is an association between a terror attack and 
suicides (as measured by fatal traffic accidents) three days later.32 
By showing first that other types of minor accidents were 
unassociated with terror attacks three days prior, Stecklov and 
Goldstein eliminate a worry about random sampling error for traffic 
accidents.33 By eliminating on common sense any other plausible 
factor that might cause both a terror attack and then higher traffic 
fatalities three days later, the researchers eliminate the main 
challenge to the prima facie case for causation.34 
Finally, computer scientists, philosophers, and statisticians 
have in the past few decades developed, and in now dozens of 
instances successfully used, a technique called model search to 
move beyond the prima facie case for causation.35 For example, 
model search was used on a biological case involving the effect of 
pollution on Spartina grass in the Cape Fear estuary.36  Contrary to 
the conclusions reached by biologists using multiple regression, 
model search suggested that pH37 (a clear side effect of several 
suspected pollutants) was the only detectible cause of Spartina 
grass biomass in the estuary. Later experiments in greenhouses 
confirmed this conclusion. 
Again, model search is no panacea. In theory, model search 
does not locate a single causal hypothesis. It locates all the causal 
hypotheses that are indistinguishable on the background knowledge 
                                                           
31 Guy Stecklov & Joshua R. Goldstein, Terror Attacks Influence Driving 
Behavior in Israel, 101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 14551, 
14551–56 (2004). 
32 Stecklov and Goldstein use fatal accidents as a measure of suicide rates 
because of the unreliability of suicide data in Israel: “[B]ecause of religious 
restrictions on the burial of suicide victims in Jewish cemeteries,” actual 
suicides are almost never recorded as suicides in Israel. Id. at 14555. 
33 Id. at 14554–55. 
34 Id. at 14555. 
35 See SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 5, at 196–98; BILL SHIPLEY, CAUSE 
AND CORRELATION IN BIOLOGY: A USER’S GUIDE TO PATH ANALYSIS, 
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 21–63. 
36 See SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 5. 
37 pH is a measure of the acidity or alkalinity of a solution. 
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and data given. In many cases this is not sufficient to overcome the 
challenges to the prima facie case. 
IV. A SCIENTIFIC CHECKLIST FOR CAUSATION 
In summary, evaluating the scientific case for causation can 
follow the stages of making it: 
1.  Make a prima facie case: 
a. establish an association between the putative cause 
and the effect, as measured by an appropriate statistic, 
e.g., Relative Risk, Odds Ratio, or Correlation 
b. assess the statistical evidence for the association with 
hypothesis tests (p-values), or confidence intervals 
2. Consider challenges to the prima facie case, e.g., 
alternative explanations of the association. 
a. Confounding: differences in the populations being 
compared or factors affecting exposure to the cause and 
the effect, e.g., income 
b. Recall bias 
3.  Employ strategies to overcome these challenges. 
a. Statistically Adjust for Confounders, e.g., multiple 
regression 
i. Have all confounders been measured? 
ii. Have all confounders been measured well? 
b. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
c. Use temporal or background knowledge 
d. Model search 
4.  Consider biological/mechanistic evidence. 
a. Animal Studies 
b. Cell Studies 
c. Biological Mechanisms 
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CONCLUSION 
The overall case for causation depends upon making a prima 
facie case and then dispatching the plausible challenges to it. The 
confidence we put in certain components of this case, e.g., 
establishing an association to make the prima facie case, should 
depend heavily on statistical methods. The confidence we put in 
the overall case for causation, however, should depend as much on 
scientific judgment and other forms of evidence as on statistics. 
For example, in assessing the effect of exposure to 
formaldehyde on leukemia and nasopharyngeal cancer, researchers 
from the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) 
weighed the complete body of evidence for causation.38 In the case 
of nasal cancer, early work on animals and on mechanisms by 
which formaldehyde might cause nasal cancer favored causation, 
but only after epidemiological evidence showed both a strong 
prima facie connection as well as a good case for withstanding 
challenges to the prima facie case did IARC conclude that 
formaldehyde should be added to the group of agents that are 
carcinogenic to humans.39 By contrast, in the case of leukemia, 
epidemiological studies demonstrated a significant statistical 
association between formaldehyde exposure and leukemia even 
after adjusting for potential confounding, but IARC would not 
classify the relation as causal because of mechanistic and biological 
evidence showing that inhaled formaldehyde breaks down before it 
reaches the bone marrow, and that only by being in the bone 
marrow can it cause leukemia.40 
                                                           
38 Press Release, Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, IAFD Classifies 
Formaldehyde as Carcinogenic to Humans (June 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.iarc.fr/ENG/Press_Releases/archives/pr153a.html (last visited Feb. 
13, 2007). 
39 Id. 
40 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR 
RESEARCH ON CANCER (IARC), IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF 
CARCINOGENIC RISK TO HUMANS: PREAMBLE (2006), available at 
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf (last visited Nov. 
27, 2007). 
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In the toxic tort hypothetical involving QualChem 43, the 
overall evidence is thin, and perhaps inconclusive, as to whether 
there is a substantial effect in general or in the specific case of Mr. 
Smith. Nevertheless, the evidence cannot be dismissed because it 
lacks scientific validity. The biological evidence from rats appears 
scientifically sound, is relevant to the onset of liver cancer, and 
shows an effect, even if only at relatively high doses. Translating 
dose equivalents between rats and humans is problematic, but the 
practice is based on much more than speculation. 
The epidemiological evidence makes a reasonable prima facie 
case for causation by showing an association between QualChem 
43 exposure and liver cancer. That the association (an odds ratio of 
3.2) is “not significant” at .05 is a red herring based entirely on the 
.05 convention. The association is significant at under .10, thereby 
indicating that there is under a 10% chance that the observed 
association is purely due to random chance. The remaining 
challenges to the prima facie case are recall bias and confounding. 
Although Ellen Epidemiologist testifies that recall bias should be 
negligible, it would nice to know the justification for that belief. As 
to confounding, the case control study matched populations for 
age, gender, and occupation. Occupation is part of socioeconomic 
status, and it is certainly plausible that the adjusted association 
removes significant sources of confounding. Therefore, there is 
evidence for causation. 
Overall, the case for causation may be far from conclusive, but 
it is based on both biological and epidemiological evidence, both of 
which suggest that QualChem 43 causes liver cancer. Whether or 
not Mr. Smith’s particular case of liver cancer was caused by his 
exposure to QualChem 43 is another question altogether, and 
depends on his level of exposure and other risk factors that might 
have affected him. Dr. Epidemiologist does testify that, after ruling 
out other risk factors like alcohol or hepatitis B, it is her scientific 
opinion that his liver cancer was caused by QualChem 43. Whether 
or not one agrees with her, her opinion is clearly based on 
reasonable science. The evidence upon which her conclusion is 
based is not conclusive, but it is undoubtedly scientific. 
In the scientific literature on the effects of low-level lead 
exposure on children, few deny that there is a statistical association 
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between lead exposure and low IQ, even after adjusting for 
measures of potential confounders.41 The issue to the scientists, 
however, is whether the potential confounders have been measured 
accurately enough to guard against a bias in the adjusted statistical 
estimate of association.42 That is, the challenge of potential 
confounding is difficult to overcome because of the difficulty of 
measuring the potential confounders precisely and accurately. 
Thus, for judges handling a case involving causation, especially 
one subject to Daubert,43 or for attorneys who must make or 
challenge a case to a jury, the overall scientific evidence for 
causation involves statistics but also involves much more. 
The questions to ask of the literature and of experts who might 
testify in court are: 
1. Is there a prima facie case? That is, is there statistical 
association between the purported cause and the effect? 
2. What are the challenges to the prima facie case?  That is, 
what other explanations of the association besides causation 
are plausible? 
3. What evidence is there to overcome challenges to the 
prima facie case?  That is, what statistical evidence do we 
have about adjusted associations, and what assumptions 
must we adopt in order to have confidence in this statistical 
                                                           
41 See Steven Fienberg, Clark Glymour, & Richard Scheines, Expert 
Statistical Testimony and Epidemiological Evidence: the Toxic Effects of Lead 
Exposure on Children, J. ECONOMETRICS 33–48 (2002); Laurentius Marais & 
William, Correcting for Omitted-Variables and Measure-Error Bias in 
Regression With an Application to the Effect of Lead on IQ, 93 JASA 442, 
494–505 (1998). 
42 See Steven Fienberg, Clark Glymour, & Richard Scheines, supra note 
40; Richard Scheines, Estimating Latent Causal Influences: TETRAD III 
Variable Selection and Bayesian Parameter Estimation: the Effect of Lead on 
IQ, in HANDBOOK OF DATA MINING (2001), available at 
http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/scheines/leadiq.pdf; Laurentius Marais & 
William Wecker, Correcting for Omitted-Variables and Measure-Error Bias in 
Regression With an Application to the Effect of Lead on IQ, 93 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 494, 494–505 (1998). 
43 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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evidence?  Further, how sensitive are the results to these 
assumptions? 
4. What does biological, toxicological, mechanistic, and/or 
animal study evidence show? 
In many, many cases, the scientific evidence for general or 
specific causation is neither conclusive nor compelling.44 
Regardless, we do not want to prevent expert testimony on 
evidence which falls short of some degree of certainty, but rather, 
we want to prevent testimony on evidence which is unscientific. 
                                                           
44 See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, (8th Cir. 
2001) (excluding plaintiff’s expert evidence and determining insufficient evidence 
of causation); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. 
Ala. 2000) (admitting plaintiff’s expert evidence for causation). 
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ATTACHMENT TO CAUSATION, STATISTICS, 
AND THE LAW BY RICHARD SCHEINES 
TOXIC TORT HYPOTHETICAL* 
Mrs. Wynona Smith, a resident of Faulkner, Mississippi, filed 
this diversity action, as Administratrix of her husband’s estate, 
against QualChem Manufacturing Co. for wrongful death and 
personal injuries. The claim results from Mr. Smith’s exposure to 
QualChem 43, a chemical released into the Blue River by 
QualChem Manufacturing Co. as a by-product of its manufacturing 
operations.  Recovery is sought on theories of negligence, strict 
liability for ultrahazardous activities, private nuisance, and 
trespass. The complaint alleges that the amount in controversy 
exceeds $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 
The complaint states that Mr. Smith contracted liver cancer and 
died as a result of this cancer, caused by exposure to QualChem 43. 
Mrs. Smith alleges that her husband was exposed to QualChem 43 
in the drinking water of the family home, located on the banks of 
the Blue River. Mrs. Smith and her husband resided on the banks 
of the Blue River for 45 years.  Mr. Smith died 12 months ago after 
a four year battle with cancer. The family drinking water is drawn 
from a well on their property adjacent to the river. 
In its answer, QualChem Manufacturing Co. admits that it 
began manufacturing operations in Tennessee 85 years ago.  The 
plant is five miles from the state line of Mississippi and 10 miles 
upriver from plaintiff’s property. The answer alleges that 
QualChem 43 is a by-product of its manufacturing process and that 
small amounts of QualChem 43 have been discharged into the Blue 
                                                           
 *  This hypothetical, which was originally developed by Professor Margaret 
A. Berger of Brooklyn Law School and Professor Diane L. Zimmerman of New 
York University School of Law, has been revised by the Federal Judicial Center. 
We thank the FJC for making it available for the Science for Judges program and 
for publication. 
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River for many years. The answer denies that Mr. Smith’s liver 
cancer was caused by QualChem 43. 
As a result of admissions obtained during discovery, the parties 
do not dispute that as a result of flooding that occurs in Faulkner, 
wells on riverfront property are contaminated with QualChem 43 
at a level of approximately 40 micrograms per liter. That level of 
contamination has been stable over the past 85 years, since 
QualChem Manufacturing Co. began its operations in Tennessee. 
In addition, fish in the Blue River have been found to contain 
QualChem 43, at a level varying from 20 to 100 micrograms per 
kilogram of body weight. The contamination of the Blue River and 
its fish with QualChem 43 has been highly publicized in Faulkner 
and other communities in the vicinity of the river for at least a 
decade. No other source of QualChem 43 contamination of the Blue 
River is known. 
Following expert discovery, defendant moved to have all of 
plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ testimony declared inadmissible 
because it lacks scientific validity, and filed a motion for summary 
judgment, claiming that no genuine issue of material fact exists with 
regard to the question of QualChem 43 causing Mr. Smith’s cancer. 
Defendant’s motion was supported by affidavits deemed adequate 
by the court. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing at which 
plaintiff’s two expert witnesses, Dr. Teresa Toxicologist and Dr. 
Ellen Epidemiologist, testified on the causation issue.  A summary 
of the testimony of each of the three witnesses at the hearing 
follows. 
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PLAINTIFF’S FIRST WITNESS - DR. ELLEN 
EPIDEMIOLOGIST 
Mrs. Smith’s first expert witness is Dr. Ellen Epidemiologist 
who has degrees in epidemiology and medicine.  The court has 
determined that this witness is qualified to testify as an 
epidemiologist and as a physician. 
On direct examination, the witness testifies that there is one 
epidemiological study of the effects of QualChem 43 on humans, a 
case-control study. The study was performed recently, has been 
submitted to an epidemiological journal for publication, and is 
currently undergoing peer review as part of the submission 
process. She testifies that the study was conducted because of 
anecdotal reports of an increased incidence of cancer, particularly 
liver cancer, among residents living near the river in and around 
Faulkner. 
The study was conducted by epidemiologists employed by the 
Mississippi Department of Public Health. In the study, the 
epidemiologists identified individuals with liver cancer from a state 
solid tumor registry. Controls were matched for age, gender, and 
occupation and obtained from a state registry of organ donors. 
None of the controls had liver cancer. 
Both cases and controls were personally interviewed and their 
medical records obtained. A variety of factors were assessed, 
including other known causes of liver cancer, which include 
alcoholism and hepatitis B virus. Cases and controls were asked 
about the source of their drinking water, and unless the initial 
answer clearly included or excluded drinking water from the Blue 
River, the interviewer asked specifically about whether the subject 
drank water from the Blue River. Unless the subject obtained 
virtually all of his or her water from the Blue River or a well 
situated close to it, the individual was treated as unexposed. 
Among the cases, 9 were classified as exposed to Blue River 
water (and therefore QualChem 43) and 3 were unexposed. In the 
control group, 44 were exposed to Blue River water and 44 were 
not. Using standard statistical methodology, Dr. Epidemiologist 
testifies that the odds ratio for the association between exposure to 
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Blue River water and liver cancer is 3.2. A nested confidence 
interval, representing two different statistical significance levels 
was constructed by the authors of the study and is displayed 
below. 
EXHIBIT A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the association between liver cancer and exposure to 
QualChem 43 in drinking water found in this study, Dr. 
Epidemiologist testifies that QualChem 43 causes liver cancers in 
humans. 
On cross-examination, about the epidemiological study and its 
implications, Dr. Epidemiologist concedes that: 
The study suffered from the possibility of recall bias, in that 
those with liver cancer were more likely to recall having been 
exposed to Blue River water than those who did not have liver 
cancer. Nevertheless, Dr. Epidemiologist stated that she believed 
any bias that existed would only have a negligible effect on the 
outcome. 
While cases and controls were treated as wholly exposed or 
unexposed, some of the participants treated as unexposed may 
have been partially exposed to QualChem 43 at work, while 
visiting friends or relatives, or in other situations. 
ODDS RATIO 
 
 
             _<——————  .90 CI    —————————————————>_ 
 
         _<———————  .95 CI    ———————————————————>_ 
 
      •  
|———|———|———|———|———|———|———|———|———|———|——//——| 
0         1.0         2.0       3.0                     5.0                                                          10.0           15.0 
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The association between liver cancer and exposure to 
QualChem 43 found in the study is not statistically significant at 
the .05 level; the lower boundary of the .95 confidence interval 
includes the odds ratio value of 1.0. However, Dr. Epidemiologist 
testifies that the association is statistically significant at the .10 
level, because the lower boundary of the .90 confidence interval 
does not include an odds ratio of 1.0. 
The authors of the epidemiological study stated in the study 
that their conclusion was that the study was suggestive that 
QualChem 43 caused liver cancer but that further research was 
required before QualChem 43’s carcinogenicity could be considered 
proven. 
On further direct examination, Dr. Epidemiologist testifies that 
she reviewed Mr. Smith’s medical records and interviewed his 
widow. She testifies that Mr. Smith died of liver cancer. 
Dr. Epidemiologist determined that Mr. Smith had been 
exposed to QualChem 43 by inquiring of plaintiff about her 
husband’s drinking water and consumption of fish. Dr. 
Epidemiologist learned from her that her husband did catch and eat 
fish from the river approximately twice a week for most of his 
adult life. When at home, decedent drank water that was drawn 
from the well on the property. Based on this information, Dr. 
Epidemiologist concluded Mr. Smith was exposed to QualChem 
43. 
In addition, Dr. Epidemiologist determined the other known 
causes of liver cancer. While roughly 50 percent of liver cancers are 
due to unknown causes, Dr. Epidemiologist ascertained that two 
known causes of liver cancer are alcoholism and the hepatitis B 
virus. Based on Mr. Smith’s medical records and the interview with 
plaintiff, Dr. Epidemiologist was able to rule out both of these risk 
factors. Based on the toxicological and epidemiological evidence, 
Mr. Smith’s exposure to QualChem 43, and ruling out alcoholism 
and hepatitis B as possible causes of Mr. Smith’s cancer, Dr. 
Epidemiologist concluded that Mr. Smith’s liver cancer was caused 
by exposure to QualChem 43 to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. 
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PLAINTIFF’S SECOND WITNESS - DR. 
TERESA TOXICOLOGIST 
Mrs. Smith’s second witness is Dr. Teresa Toxicologist.  The 
court reviewed Dr. Toxicologist’s curriculum vitae and determined 
that she is qualified to testify.  Dr. Toxicologist has identified two 
published studies on the carcinogenic effects of QualChem 43 on 
animals. 
Exhibit B (attached) shows the results of a published study 
conducted on mice. The study consisted of two groups, one group 
of mice was exposed to QualChem 43 in its drinking water, and one 
group was not exposed to QualChem 43 in its drinking water.  
Both groups were given 5 milliliters of water per kilogram of body 
weight on a daily basis. The exposed group’s water contained 5 
milligrams of QualChem 43 per liter of water. Among the exposed 
mice, 14 out of 92 developed liver cancer for an incidence of .15, 
and among the unexposed mice, 2 out of 85 developed liver cancer, 
for an incidence of .02.  Thus, those mice that were exposed to 
QualChem 43 had approximately seven times the rate of liver 
cancer as the unexposed mice. Dr. Toxicologist testifies that the 
difference in the rate of liver cancer in the two groups is 
statistically significant at the .05 level. She also testifies that the 
dose of QualChem 43 to which the mice were exposed is 
approximately 125 times the dose humans would receive over a 
lifetime if their drinking water contained 40 micrograms per liter of 
QualChem 43 (approximately the dose to which Mr. Smith was 
exposed). 
Exhibit C (attached) shows the results of a published study 
conducted on Sprague Dawley rats. This study was conducted 
using three separate groups of exposed rats and a group of 
unexposed rats. The three exposed groups of rats were subjected to 
a low dose of QualChem 43 (80 micrograms of QualChem 43 per 
liter of water), a medium dose (500 micrograms of QualChem 43 
per liter of water), and a high dose (25 milligrams of QualChem 43 
per liter of water). Dr. Toxicologist explains that these dosages 
roughly conform to a lifetime exposure in humans of two times, 10 
times, and 500 times, respectively, the dose to which Mr. Smith 
was exposed. 
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Among the unexposed group of rodents, 4 out of 200 
developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .02. In the low dose 
group, 3 out of 170 developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .018. 
In the medium exposed group, 16 out of 194 rats developed kidney 
cancer, an incidence of .08, and in the high dose group, 44 out of 
210 developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .21. The difference in 
incidence between the control group and the low exposure cohort 
was not statistically significant (p > .5), the differences between 
each of the medium and high dose groups and the control group 
were both statistically significant at the .05 level. Exhibit C 
(attached) contains a dose-response curve that reflects the 
incidence of cancer based on the dose to which each group of 
rodents was exposed. Because researchers believe that both liver 
and kidney cancer are initiated by perturbations in cell 
differentiation, Dr. Toxicologist believes that the results of this 
study are relevant to the question of whether QualChem 43 causes 
liver cancer. 
Based on these two studies, Dr. Toxicologist testifies that in 
her opinion QualChem 43 is clearly carcinogenic in two different 
species of rodents and that it is likely to be carcinogenic in the 
human species. 
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EXHIBIT B 
 
SUMMARY OF MOUSE DATA 
 
          UNEXPOSED GROUP                                 EXPOSED GROUP 
 
         # with       # in                         # with              # in 
   Liver Cancer      Group    Incidence                   Liver Cancer       Group        Incidence 
 
            2                    85           .02                                14                     92               .15 
EXHIBIT C 
 
SUMMARY OF RAT DATA 
 
 
      UNEXPOSED GROUP           LOW EXPOSED GROUP 
 
# with            # in                           # with                  # in 
Kidney Cancer    Group  Incidence      Kidney Cancer     Group  Incidence 
 
      4             200          .02                                 3                    170        .018 
 
 
 MEDIUM EXPOSED GROUP                       HIGH EXPOSED GROUP 
 
# with         # in          # with                 # in 
   Kidney Cancer      Group       Incidence    Kidney Cancer Group   Incidence 
 
         16                     194                .08                                   44                  210           .21 
